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("EAJA") to the language of Rule 11
which it considered analogous.
Under the EAJA, the federal government must be "substantially justified"
for its action or inaction. If litigants are
forced to challenge the federal government's activities in court, attorney fees
may be awarded against the government
unless its activities were "substantially
justified." A district court's decision on
that issue is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id. at 2459-60 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 US. 552,
559-60 (1988».
The Court reasoned that determining
whether an action was "substantially
justified" under the EAJA was analogous
to determining whether an attorney's
complaint was factually well-grounded
and legally tenable for Rule 11 purposes.
Both situations require fact-specific findings which, according to the Court, the
district courts are in a better position to
make. Furthermore, district courts are
"best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated
to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 11 's goal of specific
and general deterrence." Id. at 2460.
Since an abuse of discretion standard
had been applied to district court findings under the EAJA, the Court held that
the same standard of review was appropriate for district court findings under
Rule 11. Id. at 2460-61.
Finally, the Court considered the petitioner's contention that the court of
appeals erroneously found that Rule 11
sanctions may include attorney fees incurred as a result of an appeal of the
sanction. The Court interpreted the language of Rule 11 and the drafter's comments as limited to those costs directly
incurred as a result of the filing of the
frivolous suit. The Court reasoned that
o
.
the attorney fees on appeal dld not stem
from the filing of the complaint, but
rather from the imposition of the sanctions by the district court. Id. at 2461. In
that Rule 38 provides attorney fees and
damages for wrongful appeal, the Court
reasoned, the scope of Rule 11 is naturally limited to fees connected with the
filing of the complaint. Id. at 2462. Following the American rule that the prevailing litigant would not ordinarily be
entitled to attorney fees, the Court reversed on this issue. Id.
In Cooter & Gell, the decision of the

Court clarifies the manner in which
Rule 11 should be applied by district
courts. Now, even if a plaintiffvoluntarily dismisses a suit, the district court may
impose sanctions for violation of Rule
lIon both the plaintiff and the plaintift's
attorney, subject only to review for
abuse of discretion.
- Laura Campbell
NOW v. Operation Rescue: INJUNC.
TION PROHIBITING BLOCKING
ACCESS TO ABORTION F ACILI·
TIES IN VIOLATION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS CONSPIRACY STATUTE
UPHELD
In NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that pro-life demonstrators
could be enjoined from blocking entry
to an abortion clinic on the ground that
it denied women their constitutional
right to interstate travel in violation of
the civil rights conspiracy statute. The
court affirmed the district court injunction on the ground that there was no
abuse of discretion.
The plaintiffs/appellees (hereinafter
"NOW') were nine clinics that provided abortion-related services and five
organizations devoted to preserving
women's rights to obtain abortions. Defendants/appellants (hereinafter "Operation Rescue") were Operation Rescue, a pro-life organization, and six
individuals who opposed abortion and
sought to have the procedure made
illegal.
NOW filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. They sought to enjoin Opera. tion Rescue from blocking entry to and
exit from facilities that offered abortion
and abortion-related services. The motion was filed, and granted, in anticipation of rescue demonstrations which
were scheduled to take place in the
immediate future in the Washington
metropolitan area. Although the court
enjoined the defendants from "trespassing on, blockading, impeding or
obstructing access to or egress from the
[listed 1premises," it declined to extend
the injunction to the activities that
tended to "intimidate, harass or disturb
patients or potential patients." Id. at
584.

The district court concluded that the
defendants' activities violated the provisions of 42 US.c. § 1985(3) (1988) by
depriving women seeking abortions and
abortion-related services of their constitutional right to travel interstate in
search of medical facilities. Id. To bring
a successful action under § 1985( 3), the
court noted, a plaintiff must prove a
conspiracy to deprive any person, or
class of persons, of the equal protection
of the laws, or of the equal privileges and
immunities under the law. In addition,
the plaintiff must prove that the conspirators committed acts in furtherance of
their goals, thus causing injury to persons or property, and depriving any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United
States. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914
F.2d at 584 (citing 42 US.C. §1985
(3». The district court reasoned that
rescue demonstrations were acts in furtherance of a conspiracy which interfered with the right to travel in that
many women in the Washington metropolitan area traveled interstate to obtain
abortions and abortion related services.
Id. at 585.
Finally, the district court concluded
that injunctive relief was appropriate
because: "(i) there was no adequate
remedy at law; (li) the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs; and (iii) the
public interest was served by granting
the injunction." Id.
The defendants appealed the order,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to grant relief against three of
their members. Id. at 586. NOW crossappealed on the ground that the scope
of the injunction was too narrow, contending that the district court abused its
discretion in limiting the injunction to
Northern Virginia and for refusing to
grant the requested relief on a permanent basis. Id. The arguments of both
parties were duly noted, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the lower
court.
Citing the ruling of the district court,
the fourth circuit court agreed that the
defendants' conduct crossed the line
from persuasion to coercion, denying
women the exercise oflegallyprotected
rights. Id. at 585. Further, the court
noted that the district court holding was
consistent with at least six other circuit
courts of appeals which have similarly
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interpreted the "purpose" element of
§1985(3) such that "gender-based animus" fulfilled its terms. Id. The circuit
court also referred to New York NO W v.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). In
New York NOW, a factually similar case,
the second circuit court of appeals held
that blocking access to abortion facilities that served interstate clientele violated the constitutional right to travel.
NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at
585.
In determining whether the district
court acted properly in granting the
injunction, the circuit court noted Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 US. 43,
50-51 (1923), as providing the appropriate standard of review. In Prendergast, the Court held that the factors to
be considered in reviewing whether
there was an abuse of discretion are the
entry, duration, and scope ofthe injunction. The circuit court held there was rio
abuse of discretion in NOWv. Operation
Rescue because the lower court ruling
substantially conformed to the rulings of
other circuit courts on the relevant
questions of law. NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 585. The court of
appeals also found that the scope of the
injunction was reasonable because, although the district court limited the
injunction to Northern Virginia for a
definitive period of time, it was implicit
in the district court opinion that the
relief was granted against particular individuals and particular acts. The circuit
court also affirmed the district court's
decision not to expand the injunction to
encompass activities tending to "intimidate, harass or disturb patients or potential patients" on the grounds that
those activities were protected by the
first amendment. NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 584. Members of
Operation Rescue were free, by verbal
means, to attempt to persuade women
not to seek the services of abortion facilities and to "'impress upon members of
society' the moral rightness and intensity of their opposition to abortion." Id.
at 586 (quoting NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D.
Va. 1989)).
By its ruling, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit established that right-to-life demonstrators
could be enjoined from blocking access

to abortion and abortion related facilities located in the fourth circuit jurisdiction. In addition, NOW v. operation
Rescue is Significant as it holds that a
woman's right to travel cannot be infringed upon by demonstrators' first
amendment rights to freedom of speech.
-Michael Scott Cohen
Illinois v. Rodriguez: WARRANTLESS
ENTRY VALID IF BASED ON THE
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT A
CONSENTING THIRD PARTY
POSSESSED COMMON AUTHORITY OVER THE PREMISES
The Supreme Court recently expanded the scope of third party consent
upon which government authorities may
rely when entering a defendant's home.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793
(1990), the Supreme Court held that a
warrantless entry by police was valid
when based upon the consent of a third
party whom police reasonably believed
possessed common authority over the
premises.
Gail Fischer, who previously lived
with Edward Rodriguez in his apartment, was assaulted by Rodriguez and
summoned police to her mother's home
to report the assault. Facilitating Rodriguez's arrest, Fischer accompanied
police to Rodriguez's apartment and
consented to their entry using a key that
she possessed. The police had neither an
arrest warrant for Rodriguez nor a search
warrant for the apartment. The police
believed that Fischer had authority to
consent based upon several references
to the apartment as "our" apartment and
her statement that she had clothing and
furniture in the apartment. Upon enter·
ing Rodriguez's apartment, the police
observed drug paraphernalia and co·
caine in plain view and, discovering Rodriguez asleep in his bedroom, they ar·
rested him. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at
2797 (1990).
Rodriguez moved to suppress all evidence seized at the time of the arrest,
claiming that Fischer had vacated the
apartment several weeks earlier and
thus no longer possessed authority to
consent to the entry. The trial court
agreed and granted Rodriguez's motion
to suppress. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme
Court denied the state's Petition for
Leave to Appeal. The United States

Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at
2797.
The Court began its analysis by examining United States v. Matlock, 415 US.
164 (1974) and the fourth amendment's
general prohibition against warrantless
entry into a person's home. Rodriguez,
110 S. Ct. at 2797 (citing u.s. v. Matlock,
415 US. 164 (1974)).InMatlock,police
officers entered premises without a warrant but with the consent of a third party
who, because of joint access or control
of the premises, possessed common
authority to consent to the entry. Id. at
2797 (1990) (citing U.S. v. Matlock,
415 US. at 171 (1974)). The Court
upheld the validity of the police entry,
reasoning that when an individual permits another joint access to or control of
his home, his expectation of privacy is
lowered. However, the Matlock Court
left unresolved the issue of the validity of
a warrantless entry based upon consent
of a third party, whom the police reasonably believe has common authority
to consent. Id. at 2801 (1990) (citing
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 US. at 177 ( 1974) ).
The Rodriguez Court, addressing the
unresolved issue in Matlock, held that
the reasonableness, and not the correctness, of the police officers' belief in
the third party's authority to consent is
the standard by which fourth amendment rights should be measured. Id. at
2800. The Court found Stoner v. California, 376 US. 483 (1964) consistent
with its reasoning in Rodriguez. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800 (1990). In
Stoner, the Court held that police improperly entered Stoner's hotel room
because it was unrealistic to believe in
the "apparent authority" of a hotel clerk
Id. at 2801 (citing Stoner v. California,
376 US. 483 (1964)).
In distinguishing Rodriguez from
Stoner, the Court emphasized that it was
unreasonable for police to believe that a
hotel clerk possessed common author. ity to consent to an entry, whereas
Fischer may have appeared to have such
authority because of her joint control.
Id. at 2801. The Court, therefore, remanded the case for a determination as
to whether the police had sufficient
grounds to support a reasonable belief
that Fischer had authority to consent. Id.
at 2801. If on remand it was determined
that the police officers were reasonable
in believing that Fischer had authOrity,
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